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COHEN UND NATORP
Helmut Holzhey
Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co., 1986.
Volume I; Ursprung und Einheit, xii + 419pp.
Volume II: Der Marburger Neukantianismus in Quellen, 536pp.
This detailed study examines the close cooperation between the two main
figures of the Marburg School, Hermann Cohen (1842-1918) and Paul Natorp
(18541924), primarily from the time that Natorp came 10 the University of
Marburg in 1880 to write his Habilitationsschrift under Cohen until Cohen's
resignation from Marburg in 1912. It is a common view that during this period
Cohen and Natorp were of one philosophical mind: Cohen developed the basic
premises of Marburg Kantianism, first in his explications of Kant's three Critiques,
and later in his own philosophical system [Logic of Pure Cognition (1902), Ethics
of the Pure Will (1904), and Aesthetics of Pure Feeling (1912)], while Natorp
used these premises in his historical studies (e.g., on Descartes and Plato) and
in the construction of his social pedagogy. On this account, it was not until
Cohen's departure from Marburg, or even not until the latter's death, that Natorp's
philosophy began to differentiate clearly from Cohen's, taking an increasingly
metaphysical-mystical turn. Holzhey successfully undermines this view. He
shows that during Cohen's Marburg period Natorp was actually critical of some
basic aspects of Cohen's epistemic logic, ethics, and philosophy of religion, but
that Natorp underplayed his disagreements and largely kept them from becoming
public.
To substantiate his thesis, Holzhey first offers in Volume I a detailed
history of the Marburg School. This exposition makes clear that here are several
factors that can account for Nalorp's reluctance to publicize his philosophical
objections to Cohen's system, such as their friendship, Natorp's personal and
intellectual indebtedness to Cohen, and Cohen's dominant personality (see p.
36). More importantly, Holzhey's historical exposition (and his study in general)
brings to ou~ attention the richness and philosophical creativity of Marburg
Kantianism, not only as displayed in the works of Cohen and Natorp, but also as
developed by their students Ernst Cassirer, Albert Garland, and Karl Vorlander
(to mention only a few). This point can hardly be sufficiently stressed; for, as
Holzhey notes with obvious disapproval, today's Kantian philosopher "prefers to
toil on the basis of the original Kantian thoughts, often simply out of ignorance of
neo-Kantian concepts" (p. ix).
Holzhey next provides a comparative analysis of the views of Cohen and
Natorp, focussing on their epistemic disagreements. In the course of this analysis
Holzhey uses various hitherto unpublished materials, such as Natorp's critical
review of Cohen's Logic of Pure Cognition, which Natorp decided not to submit
for publication in Kant-Studien after Cohen had objected that it did not
adequately represent his own viewpoint (see p. 35). These materials, together
with numerous letters by Cohen and Natorp, can be found in Volume II. (The
letters necessarily offer a one-sided picture of the dialogue between Cohen and

Natorp; only some drafts of letters from Natorp to Cohen are extant, as Cohen's
personal papers were lost when his wife was deported to Theresienstadt.)
Holzhey's focus on Cohen's and Natorp's epistemic logic, though
unobjectionable in itself, has at times a distortive effect. For example, Holzhey
rightly argues that the transcendental method constitutes the "connecting
element" of the Marburg School (see Volume I, pp. 49 ff.), but what also needs to
be emphasized is that most Marburg Kantians held that Kant's notion of the
kingdom of ends sets forth the demand for democratic socialism. In short, the
Marburg School aspired to be not just an academic force, but also a socialpolitical force, seeking to correct the dogmatic Marxism of the German Social
Democratic Party. Likewise, Holzhey deals too hastily with Cohen's ethics in his
discussion of the interconnectedness of Cohen's system (see Volume 1, Chapter
X). Holzhey inadequately stresses that Cohen saw not only a methodic unity
between epistemic logic and ethics, but also maintained in Ethics of the Pure Will
that both theoretical and practical reason (science and ethics) must aim at the
unification of natural and moral laws (i.e., "truth"), a postulated possibility that has
its ultimate ground in the regulative idea of God. Thus it can be argued, more
emphatically than Holzhey does, that some of Natorp's criticisms of the "weak"
interconnectedness of Cohen's system are misplaced.
A short review can hardly do justice to the richness of Holzhey's study: we
can find in his work a complete bibliography of Cohen's writings, a fascinating
description of the inner faculty struggles at Marburg, which came to a climax
when Cohen did not succeed in making Cassirer his successor, as well as
interesting notes on the failed attempts of the Marburg Kantians to acquire their
own journal and on their polemic with the editors of Kant-Studien. Also, Holzhey's
numerous annotations to the letters of Cohen and Natorp offer a wealth of
information concerning German philosophy around the turn of the century,
besides being hel pfuJ in exploring Cohen's and Natorp's attitudes to some of the
main German political figures and events of the lime. All this makes Holzhey's
study indispensible, both for the Kantian philosopher and the historian of
Wilhelmian Germany.
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